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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the issue 
countering shadow activities in the context of ensuring macroeconomic stability. The main purpose of the 
study is to determine the acceptable level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, which 
corresponds to the balance between the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic 
stability. The relevance of this scientific problem is that the shadow investment activities distorts the market 
mechanism and makes it impossible to attract financial resources for expanded reproduction in the country. 
The research of shadow investment activity in the paper is carried out in the following logical sequence: the 
dynamics of the level of shadowing of Ukraine’s economy, its macroeconomic stability and volume of 
investment activity with signs of fictitiousness are analyzed, the forms of functional dependence between the 
analyzed indicators are determined. national economy and maximizing its macroeconomic stability. 
Methodological tools of the research methods were linear and nonlinear regression analysis, iterative method 
of Brown-Robinson, which is the basis for solving the problem of game theory. The study period is 2010-2019. 
The paper proves the existence of a nonlinear functional dependence of the level of investment operations with 
signs of fictitiousness on the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic stability. The 
study empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the volume of investment activity with signs of 
fictitiousness at 14.76% of GDP is achieved by increasing macroeconomic stability to 0.840 share and reducing 
the shadowing of the national economy to 36.30% of GDP. The results of the study can be useful for the 
executive branch in the formation of public investment policy aimed at improving the quality of the business 
environment, reducing administrative burdens and increasing investment demand from foreign investors. 
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Introduction 
In the last decade, cross-border movement of capital is an important aspect of the world economy, as the 
volume and geography of financial resources are growing every year, as a result of expanding markets, investor 
potentially higher profitability in another country, attracting financial resources on more attractive terms etc. 
At the same time, the amount of capital inflows between countries is increasing every year in order to legalize 
illegally obtained income, avoid taxation or minimize the payment of taxes. Thus, IMF experts estimate that 
in 2017 the volume of fictitious investment activities is growing by 40% of total foreign direct investment, 
while in 2009 - 30% (Damgaard et al, 2019). Globally, the volume of shadow investment transactions is about 
15 billion US dollars, with 85% of these funds account for 10 countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Hong 
Kong, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Singapore, Cayman Island, Switzerland, Ireland and Mauritius) 
(Damgaard et al, 2019). 
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Every year, national regulators and international organizations make decisions aimed at strengthening the 
control and supervision of financial transactions through companies from offshore jurisdictions that disregard 
generally accepted global standards of corporate and financial transparency and promote the legalization of 
illicit funds, slowing down and slowing down the pace of development. also increasing the uneven distribution 
of income. In 2017, Ukraine adopted a legal act that establishes additional control and supervision by the 
relevant executive bodies when making payments to non-residents of certain countries. Thus, in 2019, Ukraine 
in the form of direct investment invested in the economy of these countries in the amount of 1.466 billion US 
dollars, about 41.4% of total foreign direct investment may be fictitious. 
The implementation of fictitious investment activities leads to the deformation of the market mechanism, 
creating a negative image of the country among the international community, destructively affecting the 
structure of the balance of payments, filling the state and local budgets, as well as the competitive environment 
in the country. Shadow investment activity diverts significant financial resources from the manufacturing 
sector, not allowing to create conditions for macroeconomic stability. Based on this, this study proposes to 
analyze the nature of the relationship between the levels of shadowing of the economy, macroeconomic 
stability and fictitious investment activities. This will allow building an optimization model to determine an 
acceptable level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, which corresponds to the balance 
between the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic stability. 
Literature review 
Theoretical and methodological problems of counteracting the shadow processes in the economy, the study of 
the preconditions and consequences of illegal economic activity occupy an important place in the work of 
scientists, namely Medina & Schneider (2019), Frunza (2017), Remeikiene & Gaspareniene (2015), Williams 
& Schneider (2016), Boiko & Samusevych (2017), Levchenko et al (2018, 2019), Tiutiunyk et al. (2019), 
Nguedie (2018), Eddassi (2020), Yoshimori (2019). A comprehensive bibliometric analysis of publications on 
the shadowing of the economy was conducted, and it was found that today this issue is closely intertwined 
with research areas such as: financial market development and financial intermediaries, poverty, drug abuse, 
gender inequality. 
The issue of the impact of foreign investment on economic growth in the country belongs to the sphere of 
scientific interests of many scientists, among which are Toyin & Oludayol (2020), Bhowmik (2018). In 
particular, the works of Marcel (2019), Agnihotri & Arora (2019) substantiate the presence of a stimulating 
effect of foreign investment on the GDP of the country's economy only in the long run. The main barriers to 
attracting foreign investment into the national economy are the imperfection of the institutional environment 
(Stavrova, 2019), and the corruption of the public administration system (Mujtaba et al, 2018), the lack of 
government programs to support socially responsible investment (Yelnikova & Kwilinsksi, 2020). In the works 
of Palienko & Lyulyov (2018) and Sineviciene et al. (2018) noted that one of the factors ensuring 
macroeconomic stability in the country is a favorable investment climate. However, despite the extensive 
coverage in the scientific literature on the problems of combating shadow economic operations, there is still 
no thorough research to analyze the relationship between the level of macroeconomic stability in the country, 
the size of the shadow sector and the level of fictitious investment transactions. 
Methodology of game theory 
A game theory is based on two key principles: 1) investigation the individual behavior; 2) the aggregation of 
individual behavior to examine more complex phenomena (Dubina and Carayannis, 2015; Samuelson, 2016). 
The use of game theory makes it possible to calculate possible options for the development of the economic 
process and determine the best steps, as well as to consider the behavior of opponents in the market (Ie and 
Onopchenko, 2014). The solution of the problem of determining an acceptable level of investment operations 
with signs of fictitiousness, which corresponds to the balance between the level of shadowing of the national 
economy and its macroeconomic stability is based on the principles of game theory using the iterative Brown-
Robinson method. The Brown-Robinson method is based on the hypothesis that a significant number of 
iterations of parties are performed to implement the “matrix game”. This, in turn, leads to the fact that players 
making decisions on iterations in terms of their strategies “accumulate” experience. As the number of iterations 
of games increases to infinity, these approximate mixed strategies will approach their optimal values, and the 
average winnings will approach the price of the game, which is characterized as the average win. Consider the 
mathematical formalization of the iterative Brown-Robinson method. So, let there be a game of size (m is the 
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number of possible strategies of player A, whose strategies are placed on the rows of the payment matrix 6; n 
is the number of possible strategies of player B, whose strategies are placed on the columns of the payment 
matrix, Table 1). 
Table 1. Payment matrix game size nm   
A\B B1 … Bs … Bt … Bn 
A1   a1s     
…        
Ak ak1 … aks … ats … ans 
…        
Al al1 … als …  … als 
…        
Am   ams …  … amn 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
1. Let the player play on the first iteration А chose a strategy Аk. In this case, player A will win - one of the 
possible values of the line ak1…akn.  
2. Player B in the opponent’s strategy suit Аk corresponds to the choice of strategy that will provide him with 
a minimum loss: 
…  (1) 
wherе  – an element of the payment matrix that characterizes the player’s winnings А and lose the player 
В at the k- turn of the first player and the 1st move of the second player; 
 - an element of the payment matrix that characterizes the win of player A and the loss of player B in the 
k- turn of the first player and the n-turn of the second player; 
…  – the minimum value among the elements …  payment matrix; 
 - payment matrix, which characterizes the player’s win А and the loss of the player В at the k- course of 
the first player and the s- course of the second player, which corresponds to the implementation of the process 
of optimizing the program of player B;  
Let’s mark the strategy of player B, which corresponds  through .  
3. Let’s mark  - the smallest value of the accumulated winnings for the player А for n iterations-parties, 
divided by the number of these iterations-parties; in accordance  – the largest value of the accumulated 





wherе ср - the arithmetic mean of the accumulated winnings of player A and the accumulated losses of player 
B for n iterations of games. 
4. Consider the second iteration-party. Player A must make a move that is a response to the choice of strategy 
of player B, which will provide him with a bigger win if player B does not change the strategy : 
…  (3)
 Suppose that a strategy , then the win from the line of the payment matrix … : 
 (4)
wherе j – varies from 1 to n, and characterizes the total winnings in the results of the first and second iterations 
of the games - the accumulated winnings of the player А.  
5. Player B chooses the strategy , which minimizes its loss.  
6. Consider the situation that arises as a result of r iterations of parties. For these r iterations of games, player 
A chose a strategy    times, player B has chosen a strategy  . Calculate the probabilities using 
player A and player B of each of their possible strategies: 
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∗  , 1  
∗  , 1  
                 (5)  
wherе ∗ - the probability of application by player A of the i strategy as a result of r iterations of parties; ∗ - the 
probability of use by the player B j- strategy as a result of r iterations-parties. 
Results 
Investment activities with signs of fictitiousness include cash flows between domestic companies and non-residents 
of those countries that require additional supervision and control by government agencies. According to the 
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 1045 of December 27, 2017, 81 countries or territories are 
included in this list. In this study, the level of foreign direct investment with signs of fictitiousness was defined as 
the ratio of the sum of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment to the country's GDP, determined as a 
percentage. The level of macroeconomic stability is assessed based on macroeconomic imbalance indicators used 
for EU countries aggregated based on the Erlango formula (Lyulyov et al, 2020). To quantify the level of shadowing 
of the economy used the method of Schneider (Medina and Schneider, 2019). Therefore, the dynamics of the above 




Figure 1. Dynamics of the level of shadowing of the economy, macroeconomic stability and foreign direct investment with 
signs of fictitiousness in Ukraine during 2010-2019 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
Figure 1 shows that in 2013-2014 there was a deterioration in macroeconomic stability in Ukraine, in 2014-2016 
increased volumes of fictitious investment activity, while in 2018-2019 there is an increase in the level of shadowing 
of the national economy. The next stage of the study is to determine the functional dependence of the level of 
investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness on the level of shadowing of the national economy and its 
macroeconomic stability. First, a hypothesis is put forward regarding the linearity of the desired relationship. Having 
chosen as a resultant indicator the level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, and as a factor - the 
level of shadowing of the economy and macroeconomic stability, we construct a linear regression equation by the 
least squares method, the parameters of which are given in the column “Coefficients” (Table 2). 
Table 2. The results of a linear regression analysis of the dependence of the level of investment transactions with 
signs of fictitiousness on the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic stability 
  Coefficients Standard error t- statistics P- Value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Y- intersection -5.03 12.03 -0.42 0.69 -33.48 23.42 
Level of macroeconomic stability -8.24 4.12 -2.00 0.09 -17.97 1.50 
The level of shadowing of the national 
economy 0.64 0.32 2.00 0.09 -0.12 1.39 
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Analysis of the adequacy of linear regression analysis of the required dependence based on the coefficient of 
determination shows that 44.30% of the variation of the resultant trait is explained by the variation of the 
selected factors, which indicates the low quality of the model and the feasibility of constructing a nonlinear 
regression equation. The existence of a nonlinear relationship between the studied indicators was analyzed. 
Consider a polynomial dependence, choosing as factorial features not only the values of the two factorials in 
the first degree, but also the squares of their values. The obtained coefficients of the regression equation are 
presented in the column “Coefficients” of Table 3. 
Table 3. The results of nonlinear regression analysis of the dependence of the level of investment transactions 
with signs of fictitiousness on the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic stability 
  Coefficients Standard error t- statistics P- Value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Y- intersection 244.57 401.66 0.61 0.57 -787.94 1277.08 
x1 12.98 35.30 0.37 0.73 -77.76 103.71 
x2 -12.17 20.13 -0.60 0.57 -63.92 39.58 
x12 -19.24 32.28 -0.60 0.58 -102.23 63.74 
x22 0.16 0.25 0.63 0.56 -0.49 0.81 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Analysis of the adequacy of nonlinear regression analysis of the required dependence in the form of a 
polynomial based on the coefficient of determination shows that 64.08% of the variation of the resultant 
characteristic is explained by the variation of the selected factors, which indicates sufficient quality of the 
model. Based on the data in Table 3, the nonlinear regression equation of the dependence of the level of 
fictitious investment operations on the level of shadowing of the national economy and its macroeconomic 
stability takes the form: 
244.57 12.98 ∙ 12.17 ∙ 19.24 ∙ 0.16 ∙  (6)  
wherе  - the level of foreign direct investment with signs of fictitiousness; 
 - level of macroeconomic stability; 
 - the level of shadowing of the national economy. 
To determine the minimum level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, which will achieve 
the lowest level of shadowing of the economy and the highest level of macroeconomic stability in the country 
built an optimization model, the parameters of which are using the iterative Brown-Robinson method. An 
important step in setting the problem of game theory is the formation of a payment matrix of a conditional 
game. Thus, based on the values of Table 4 (rows correspond to 10 scenarios for macroeconomic stability, and 
columns - 10 scenarios for shadowing the economy), considering a certain nonlinear relationship between 
variables, we calculate the elements of the payment matrix. For example, for the scenario A1 (0.840 units) and 
B9 (29.97%) the level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness becomes 21.21% of GDP. 
Table 4. Payment matrix of the conditional game of determining the acceptable level of investment transactions 
with signs of fictitiousness, which corresponds to the balance between the level of shadowing of the national 
economy (strategy B1-B10) and its macroeconomic stability (strategy A1-A10) 
  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
Scenario legend  2.95 6.33 9.71 13.08 16.46 19.84 23.22 26.59 29.97 33.35 
A1 0.840 207.35 171.28 138.87 110.11 85.02 63.58 45.80 31.67 21.21 14.41 
A2 0.858 207.00 170.93 138.52 109.76 84.67 63.23 45.45 31.32 20.86 14.06 
A3 0.876 206.64 170.57 138.16 109.40 84.30 62.86 45.08 30.96 20.50 13.69 
A4 0.893 206.27 170.20 137.78 109.03 83.93 62.49 44.71 30.59 20.12 13.32 
A5 0.91 205.88 169.81 137.40 108.64 83.54 62.10 44.32 30.20 19.74 12.93 
A6 0.929 205.48 169.41 137.00 108.24 83.14 61.71 43.93 29.80 19.34 12.53 
A7 0.947 205.07 169.00 136.59 107.83 82.73 61.30 43.52 29.39 18.93 12.12 
A8 0.964 204.65 168.58 136.16 107.41 82.31 60.87 43.09 28.97 18.51 11.70 
A9 0.982 204.21 168.14 135.73 106.97 81.88 60.44 42.66 28.54 18.07 11.27 
A10 1.000 203.77 167.70 135.28 106.53 81.43 59.99 42.21 28.09 17.63 10.82 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
Thus, considering the defined and quantitatively described strategies and elements of the payment matrix, the 
formulation of the problem of game theory takes the following form: to determine an acceptable (minimum 
possible) level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, which corresponds to the balance 
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between the minimum possible (guaranteed) national economy and the maximum possible (guaranteed in these 
conditions) level of its macroeconomic stability. To determine the parameters of the optimization model, the 
iterative Brown-Robinson method was used, the results of which are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. The results of determining the acceptable level of investment transactions with signs of fictitiousness, 
which corresponds to the balance between the level of shadowing of the national economy and its 
macroeconomic stability 
The level of 
macroeconomic stability / 
The level of shadowing of 
the national economy 
Probability of using 
the legend 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Legend B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
Probability of 
using the legend 
Legend 
  2.95 6.33 9.71 13.08 16.46 19.84 23.22 26.59 29.97 33.35 
1 A1 0.840 207.35 171.28 138.87 110.11 85.02 63.58 45.80 31.67 21.21 14.41 
0 A2 0.858 207.00 170.93 138.52 109.76 84.67 63.23 45.45 31.32 20.86 14.06 
0 A3 0.876 206.64 170.57 138.16 109.40 84.30 62.86 45.08 30.96 20.50 13.69 
0 A4 0.893 206.27 170.20 137.78 109.03 83.93 62.49 44.71 30.59 20.12 13.32 
0 A5 0.91 205.88 169.81 137.40 108.64 83.54 62.10 44.32 30.20 19.74 12.93 
0 A6 0.929 205.48 169.41 137.00 108.24 83.14 61.71 43.93 29.80 19.34 12.53 
0 A7 0.947 205.07 169.00 136.59 107.83 82.73 61.30 43.52 29.39 18.93 12.12 
0 A8 0.964 204.65 168.58 136.16 107.41 82.31 60.87 43.09 28.97 18.51 11.70 
0 A9 0.982 204.21 168.14 135.73 106.97 81.88 60.44 42.66 28.54 18.07 11.27 
0 A10 1.000 203.77 167.70 135.28 106.53 81.43 59.99 42.21 28.09 17.63 10.82 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
After 100 iterations, we obtain the following results: the choice of scenarios for the development of the national 
economy A1 and B10 will reduce the level of dubious investment activity to 14.41% of GDP, while the level 
of macroeconomic stability should be 0.840 units and shadow economy at 36.30% of GDP. 
Conclusion 
The study proposes methodological principles for determining an acceptable level of fictitious investment 
transactions, which corresponds to the balance between the level of shadowing of the national economy and 
its macroeconomic stability based on the use of game theory and Brown-Robinson method to solve the matrix 
game. The proposed tools allow to increase the validity of management decisions of executive authorities in 
the development of macroeconomic policy and its adaptation to changes in the internal and external 
environment. Further research is planned to analyze the channels of shadowing of the national economy and 
assess the degree of their impact on the macroeconomic stability of the country. 
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editing, Zolkover, A, Georgiev M.; visualization, Zolkover, A., Georgiev M.; supervision Zolkover, A., 
Georgiev M.; project administration, Zolkover, A., Georgiev M.. 
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